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Ambivalence: The Resiliency of Legal
Culture in the United States
Judith Resnik*
Law schools tell a pretty cheerful story, which goes something like this:
In 1789, the United States came into being, and its constitution-the Consti-
tution-has framed and constrained legal developments ever since. While
there have been a few bumps along the way (such as slavery, the Civil War,
and the race riots of the twentieth century), we (as in "We the People") have
persevered. If it has not all come out alright yet, it will, soon; all that is
needed is patience and constitutional faith.'
The emergence of a range of commentaries-critical legal studies, femi-
nism, critical race theory-has not made much of a dent in the basic story,
as it is retold annually in the law school classroom. While some participants
in this Symposium on Civic and Legal Education bemoan the fragmentation
of the legal scholarly enterprise, 2 they miss the stunning stability of the
classroom.
The invulnerability of the classroom to radical critique relies on at least
three factors. First, law professors tend to teach what they themselves have
been taught. Most accept that the traditional "Cases and Comments on..."
are the subject matter of particular courses.3 Few of the recent editions of
these books, in turn, revise in fundamental ways the framing of basic
* Judith Resnik, All rights reserved. Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern
California Law Center. My thanks to Barbara Babcock, Christine Carr, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Denny
Curtis, Veronica Gentilli, Carolyn Heilbrun, Deborah Hensler, Barbara Herman, Vicki Jackson,
Angela Johnson, Gladys Kessler, Peggy Radin, Deborah Rhode, Vicki Shultz, Barrie Thorne, and
Catharine Wells for joining me in thinking about these issues.
1. While this story is evidently not peculiar to law schools, but pervades United States' culture
and liberal ideology as well, it is a story of special import to legal education. Further, as detailed by
Deborah Rhode, the law reform concerns that permeate some classrooms reinforce the basic claim of
the rightness of the legal order. See Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions. Feminist Perspectives on
Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. Rv. 1547, 1548-49 (1993).
2. See Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. RaV. 1885 (1993);
Richard A. Epstein, Legal Education and the Politics of Exclusion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1607 (1993);
Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1647 (1993).
3. In 1980, I attended an intensive workshop, designed by the American Association of Law
Schools (AALS) to discuss the teaching of civil procedure. The participants came from law schools
across the country, and all taught procedure. One of the authors of a then-leading casebook an-
nounced in his talk: "If you don't teach Hanson v. Denckla, you don't teach civil procedure."
For those readers who have been taught by "illegitimate" procedure teachers, such as myself,
who neither ask students to read nor consider that case, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), is
one of dozens in which the Supreme Court details the rules governing the jurisdiction of state courts
over litigants outside their geographic boundaries.
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courses. 4 Indeed, despite the emergence over the past decade of interest in
"law and literature" and of the call for stories and narratives, few within the
legal academy have drawn from contemporary literary criticism what I take
to be a central message for law: to question what materials constitute the
canon.
5
Generations of law students read and reread the same Supreme Court
cases, and while some of the old cases are replaced by discussions of recent
4. The histories of courses that I teach, procedure and federal courts, are my primary exam-
ples. Let me offer here a capsule summary of the teaching materials for "Federal Courts" or "Fed-
eral Jurisdiction," a class concerned with the allocation of power among the federal courts,
Congress, and the Executive, and between the federal and state court systems, and typically taught
to upper division students.
In 1928, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis wrote a book, FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(1928), which provided an overview of the history and functioning of the federal courts. Soon there-
after, Frankfurter, joined first by Wilber G. Katz and later by Harry Schulman, authored a text
designed for students. Frankfurter and his collaborators aspired to distinguish their interest from
earlier federal "practice" books by considering issues they claimed appropriate for academic study.
See FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE at v (1931); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SHULMAN,
CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1937).
The authors addressed issues such as the case and controversy requirements of Article III of the
Constitution, the power of federal courts to make common law, and the allocation of jurisdiction
between state and federal courts.
That the questions explored by Frankfurter, Landis, Katz, and Shulman are familiar to today's
teachers of the subject is not a matter of chance. The contemporary conception of the course derives
in large part from that of Frankfurter and his colleagues, whose views shaped much of the content of
HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM (1953). Not only is the current edition of that book similar to the 1953 version, but most other
teaching texts have followed its choice of subject matter, albeit often in fewer pages and with a less
encyclopedic tone. See PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed.
1988); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1982); HoW-
ARD P. FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1987); PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL-STATE RELATIONS (2d ed. 1989); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COM-
MENTS AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1989). The fidelity of the "new" Hart and Wechsler to the "old"
Hart and Wechsler is explored in Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989)
(reviewing BATOR ET AL. supra).
My colleagues who teach other basic and advanced courses tell me that their courses are simi-
larly loyal to earlier conceptions. One area that has received detailed consideration is that of crimi-
nal law; a group of scholars have criticized the structure and content of the criminal law curriculum.
See Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 309 (1990). Others have noted that, even when casebooks are changed in light of such criti-
cisms, teachers may resist such innovation. In his essay, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks; and
Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992), James J. Tomkovicz explained that, although criminal
casebooks now include materials on rape, professors loyal to coverage of traditionally-taught issues
sometimes skip the topic, in part from discomfort and in part because they do not know what to
delete when new issues are added. Id. at 483. Susan Estrich's Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE LJ.
509 (1992), attempts to reassure the anxious that, while teaching rape law is "a challenge," its intel-
lectual and conceptual demands make it the best kind of topic for classroom teaching. Id. at 519-20.
Efforts are currently underway to press for more revisions of the canon. In May of 1993, the
Society of American Law Teachers convened a conference, "Integrating Class, Disability, Gender,
Race, and Sexual Orientation into Our Teaching and Course Material."
5. Instead, much of "law and literature" is either about law in literature or law as literature.
See Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergence" Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J.
1913, 1936-42 (1990).
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problems and changes in doctrine, the outlines and topics remain undis-
turbed. While "supplemental" materials are sometimes added, little is sub-
tracted from the basic story. What is reiterated is the story "already read,"
6
a generally upbeat tale that depends on not mentioning many aspects of the
United States' legal system-the centrality of slavery, the conquest of Indian
tribes and the current a-constitutional relationship between the United
States government and the tribes, the oppression of racial and ethnic groups
and of women, 7 and the effects of poverty on regimes of property-based
rights, inter alia.8
A second factor is the conservative (in the sense of preserving) power of
the law and economics movement, which is heavily financed by conservative
(in the political sense) foundations and which dominates many scholarly
fields, with tort law being a prime example. 9 Funding from the Olin Foun-
dation, the Scaife charities, and other institutions has supported fellowships
for young scholars to write in law and economics and for sitting judges to
attend seminars on law and economics.10 Much of the scholarship and com-
mentary produced thus far not only seeks to justify the status quo'1 but is
also hostile to various forms of critical scholarship. Law and economics ad-
herents sometimes characterize such work as lacking the intellectual
strength found in the economic approach.' 2 Thus, during the very same
decade in which critical commentary has emerged in force, the law and eco-
6. See Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Minefield Some Observations on the Theory,
Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism, in THE NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM: ESSAYS
ON WOMEN, LITERATURE, AND THEORY 144, 154-55 (Elaine Showalter ed., 1985).
7. For discussions of some of the implications of including the sovereignty of Indian tribes and
the status of women in courses on the federal courts, see Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: In-
dian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 671 (1989); Judith Resnik, "Natu-
rally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682
(1991).
8. That the Depression is not usually mentioned as a bump along the constitutional path illus-
trates the absence of consciousness of class in the story and explains in part why poverty has not
been understood as the basis for a federal constitutional claim. See, eg. San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the funding of
public schools through local property taxes).
9. See, eg., I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIL-
It FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE INsTrrunONAL FRAMEWORK at v-vi (1991) (listing the scholars
serving as reporters, contributors, and advisers for this work).
10. Henry G. Manne, Dean of George Mason University School of Law, for example, coordi-
nates seminars sponsored by that school's Law and Economics Center, and ran such study sessions
for many years before moving to George Mason.
11. The methods by which power is accrued include the choice of words and the deployment of
models. For example, naming an approach "rational choice" theory implies the "irrationality" of
other approaches. Similarly, the notion of "statistical discrimination"--that said to be produced by
a "rational" discriminator rather than one animated by impermissible motives--ensures that the
discussion of discrimination focuses on the experiences and perspectives of the discriminator, rather
than those of the victim.
12. As Robert Ellickson, self-identified as a law and economics scholar, puts it: "To exagger-
ate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-and-society group is deficient in
both sophistication and rigor...." ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGH-
BORS SET-rLE DISPUTES 7 (1991). Indeed, illustrative of that view, Ellickson describes his work as
"Bringing Theory to Law-and-Society Scholarship." Id. at 6. Elickson also views law and society
proponents as skeptical of law and economics scholars' understanding of "reality" and concern
about "humanity." Id. at 7.
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nomics movement has been rich with its own economic resources, and the
dominant "voice" (to borrow a phrase not often heard within that scholarly
community) of that scholarship has lent support to the cheerful tale of the
United States polity. 1
3
Third, and simply put, it is hard for professors to stand up before stu-
dents and tell them of the failures of the discipline, law, to which we who
teach have devoted ourselves and to which so many of us and them have
come with such high hopes. (Were one coming from or speaking to many
other segments of the public, that message would not be as difficult to con-
vey, nor would it be news.) It is hard not only because some students do not
want to hear it, but also because I-a white, female law teacher-am ambiv-
alent about how damning I want to be.
The resiliency of legal culture to critical attack-and the fact that it is
hard even to hear the criticism-is evident not only in the classrooms of law
schools. One also finds such resiliency in courthouses around the nation. A
movement within the courts parallels the critical commentaries of law that
have emerged in the legal community over the past decade. Much of this
work has taken the form of "gender bias task forces" and "race and ethnic
bias task forces." Since the 1980s, some thirty jurisdictions have authorized
projects to explore how courts, as decisionmakers, employers, and institu-
tions, are affected by bias based on gender, race, and ethnicity.14
The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, for example, is the first
within the federal system to ask the question of what effects gender has on its
courts and has broadened the scope of the inquiry in several respects. 15 This
task force work comes after a decade of similar projects in the state courts
and is deeply indebted to them.16 The Ninth Circuit's conclusions fit com-
fortably with those of the now more than thirty published reports on either
gender bias or race and ethnic bias in the courts.17 The uniformity is impres-
13. Few of the scholars critical of current regimes find sustained support from conservative
foundations. Critiques are funded by other means. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and
Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991) (using research done
by Ayres as an American Bar Foundation Research Fellow).
14. Illustrative is the publication, in this volume of the Stanford Law Review, of the Executive
Summary of the Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force (of which I am a
member) that was delivered to the 450 judges and lawyers at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
in August 1992. See Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, Executive Summary of the Prelimi-
nary Report of the Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2153 (1993).
15. The report is the first to consider the effects of gender on immigration, bankruptcy, federal
benefits, and federal Indian law. Further, because the Ninth Circuit encompasses nine states, the
report also draws on survey data from judges and practitioners in each of the districts within the
circuit. Id.
16. See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for
Judicial Reform, 1989 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1989) (reviewing the achievements); Norma J. Wikler,
Water on Stone: A Perspective on the Movement to Eliminate Gender Bias in the Courts, STATE CT. J.,
Summer 1989, at 3 (analyzing the history of the gender bias task force movement).
17. For a list of reports relied on in this essay, see Appendix A. I reviewed 24 jurisdictions (22
states, the District of Columbia, and the Ninth Circuit) that have published a total of 33 reports. Six
jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Washington)
have published both gender and race and ethnic bias reports. The National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) is a clearinghouse for information about such projects. See NCSC, Proceedings of the Na-
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sive, as each jurisdiction finds anew what others have found before: that
courts do not deliver on the promise of equal treatment. The cheerful tale
repeated in classrooms is thus challenged not only from within the allegedly
sheltered towers of academia but from the world of practice as well.
At their core, these task forces on bias in the courts are fabulously radi-
cal, have actually been successful in engendering some change,18 and yet are
absorbed as if the reports did not say what they do. Radical, because all of
these efforts are taken on by court systems themselves, as chief judges and
other senior officials of the legal profession break through the constitutional
story and actually ask: Do we discriminate? How? Against whom? In gen-
eral? In pervasive and diffuse ways?
How could such questions be called "radical"? Recall that the Supreme
Court of the United States, when asked in 1987 in McCleskey v. Kemp19 to
consider whether Georgia had imposed the death sentence in a generally
racially-discriminatory fashion, 20 declined the broad inquiry. The Court
said that, while it was prepared to look individually at a particular person's
claim that he or she had been sentenced to death because of racial prejudice,
the Court could not entertain a claim that the administration of the death
penalty as a whole violated the Equal Protection Clause.
21
tional Conference on Gender Bias in the Courts (Dixie K, Knoebel & Marilyn McCoy Roberts eds.,
1990).
18. See text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
19. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
20. Warren McCleskey's constitutional claim relied in large measure on a statistical study (au-
thored by Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth) which reviewed 2000
murder cases in Georgia during the 1970s. For discussion of the study and a critique of the McCles-
key decision, see DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). The
data indicated that "black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest
likelihood of receiving the death penalty." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. The Court held that "the
Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Geor-
gia capital sentencing process." Id. at 313.
The four dissenting Justices---Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens-disagreed. In their
view, the data meant that
[D]efendants charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be
sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks.... In addition, . . . 6 of
every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white person would not have received the death
penalty if their victims had been black.... [C]ases involving black defendants and white
victims are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial
combination of defendant and victim.... "here was a significant chance that race would
play a prominent role in determining if [McCleskey] lived or died.
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Reading the statistical data through the lens
of "[h]istory and its continuing legacy," as well as "social experience," the dissent concluded that
McCleskey had demonstrated that the imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional. Id. at
334-35.
On September 25, 1991, after Mr. McCleskey had argued unsuccessfully in subsequent proceed-
ings that his punishment was unconstitutional for other reasons (see McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454 (1991)), Georgia authorities executed him. See Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate Is Executed
After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A18; see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.
Ct. 2514, 2527 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing Mr. McCleskey).
21. As Justice Powell, for the Court, interpreted the Equal Protection Clause, a claimant had
to show that "decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. at 292. A defendant could not rely on a claim of discrimination that
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The Court's discussion of "each jury" as "unique," making assessments
"according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of
the particular capital offense,"'22 both relied on and reaffirmed the cheerful
constitutional tale. While "the history of racial discrimination in this coun-
try is undeniable" 23 (there have, after all, been bumps along the road),
claims of prejudice relying on "historical evidence"-stemming from Geor-
gia's laws at the time of the Civil War-could not serve as evidence relevant
to today's injuries, which occur in a world presumed not to be burdened by
that history.
As the majority explained, taking on the general issue of racism in death
penalties would implicate the general issue of racism in all kinds of sentenc-
ing penalties.24 In this conclusion lurks a "so what?"-why not explore the
general issue of racism in all kinds of sentencing penalties? What is instruc-
tive about the opinion is its unself-conscious explanation of why such a fun-
damental challenge was beyond comprehension. 25 In the words of the
Court:
[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence
rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to
claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in
other minority groups, and even to gender.
26
Task forces on gender, racial, and ethnic bias do exactly what the
Supreme Court refused to do: They ask the forbidden questions. Unlike the
Supreme Court majority in McCleskey, they seem not to fear "too much
justice" but too little.27 These task force projects are not only radical in
their inquiry, but also in their frequent and consistent answer: that despite
their emblems of "equal justice under law," courts are a venue of discrimina-
tion-against women in general, against people of color in general, against
women of color in distinct ways, against not only litigants but also against
[i]n its broadest form .... extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process,
from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that imposed the sentence,
to the State itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain in
effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application.
Id.
22. Id. at 294.
23. Id. at 298 n.20.
24. As the Court put it: "McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State's criminal
justice system." Id. at 297.
25. This case provides other insights about the nature of racial, ethnic, and gender bias. For
example, as Stephen Carter and Randall Kennedy have both noted, the Court did not even contem-
plate the implications of the Baldus data for black victims, underprotected by a legal regime that
prosecutes more aggressively those who injure whites than those who injure blacks. See Stephen L.
Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 442-47 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388,
1390-95 (1988).
26. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315-17 (footnotes omitted).
27. The phrase is Justice Brennan's. Id at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Yet even the dissent
attempted to reassure that the McCleskey challenge was a narrow one, predicated on "the uniquely
sophisticated nature of the Baldus study." Id. at 341; see also note 48 infra and accompanying text.
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court employees, and against the lawyers who come to the courts on behalf
of litigants.
Task forces have published their results, providing graphs, tables, charts,
and testimonial evidence. These materials now form a tall mound, contain-
mng serious indictments of many aspects of the legal process across a range of
issues. From states as disparate as California, Georgia, Kentucky, Mary-
land, and Minnesota, one learns that women seeking redress for "domestic"
violence are often either blamed, accused pf provoking their attacks, treated
as if the experiences were trivial, or disbelieved. 28 When the focus is on race
and ethnicity, the reports are similarly distressing; findings include that peo-
ple of color are less likely to be released on bail than are whites for similar
offenses29 and "are more likely to be held in custody following conviction
and prior to sentencing."' 30 Moreover, there is evidence of sentencing dis-
parity "that can be attributed only to race in the rate of convictions and the
types of sentences.
' 31
A significant portion of most of the reports detail problems of bias as
experienced by lawyers, court staff, and sometimes by judges themselves.
The higher echelons of most judiciaries remain filled with white men.32
Courtroom interactions--on and off the record-are often affected by race,
ethnicity, and gender bias, and employment opportunities for lawyers and
staff are limited by these forms of bias.
28. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE COURTS, THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS § 6, at 4-5 (1990) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA DRAFT GENDER
BIAS REPORT]; GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 20-21 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter GEORGIA GENDER BIAS REPORT]; KENTUCKY TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE
COURTS 29-31 (1992) [hereinafter KENTUCKY GENDER FAIRNESS REPORT]; REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 2-5 (1989) [hereinafter MARYLAND
GENDER BIAS REPORT]; MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN
THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825, 875-77 (1989) [herein-
after MINNESOTA GENDER FAIRNESS REPORT]:
29. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, Vol. II, 150-
51 (1991) (published in five volumes) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES]; REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY
COMMISSION: "WHERE THE INJURED FLY FOR JUSTICE" 23 (1991) [hereinafter FLORIDA RACIAL/
ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, Vol. II].
30. WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 11 (1990)
[hereinafter WASHINGTON MINORITY AND JUSTICE REPORT].
31. NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES, Vol. I, supra note 29, at 43; see also ALASKA JUDI-
CIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATrERNS: A MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANAL-
YSIS 27-36 (1977) [hereinafter ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING] (Blacks received higher sentences in
several categories of cases); ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE ALASKA JUDI-
CIAL COUNCIL ON FINDINGS OF APPARENT RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING 54 (1979) [herein-
after ALASKA RACIAL DISPARITY] (race of Blacks and Native Alaskans a factor in denial of
probation). But see Memorandum from Judge Robert Boochever to Attendees at the January 27,
1993 meeting on The Effects of Ethnicity, Race and Religion on the Ninth Circuit (Jan. 27, 1993)
(statistical evidence of disparity eliminated after the institution of sentencing reforms and training of
judges on cultural diversity) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
32. See, eg., FLORIDA RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 29, at 53 (1% of the
judges are women of color); Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, Executive Summary, supra
note 14, at 2156-57 ("Eighty-eight percent of Ninth Circuit judicial positions are held by men.").
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An overview of the understanding of the justice system that emerges can
be found in the general conclusions of such task forces. Although coming
from different jurisdictions, the comments are similar:33 "Women uniquely,
disproportionately, and with unacceptable frequency must endure a climate
of condescension, indifference, and hostility";34 "[W]omen are treated differ-
ently from men in the justice system and, because of it, many suffer from
unfairness, embarrassment, emotional pain, professional deprivation and
economic hardship"; 35 "[Ihe perception [is] that minorities are stripped of
their human dignity, their individuality and their identity in their encounters
with the court system"; 36 "[T]here is evidence that bias does occur with dis-
33. A review of the 33 reports listed in Appendix A finds a few that do note areas in which
there has been progress on gender or race/ethnic issues. See, eg., GEORGIA GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 28, at xi (finding "no widespread and overt gender bias," yet "there is evidence that
gender bias does exist within Georgia's judicial system"); KENTUCKY GENDER FAIRNESS REPORT,
supra note 28, at 6 (reporting that "experiences in the courts are not as bad as they once were");
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW MEXICO STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (1988) ("although the law has made significant gains," remedial recommendations are
still appropriate).
Two reports, both emanating from the local courts of the District of Columbia, have the most
positive comments about the current state of gender and racial/ethnic bias in those courts. FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS (1992) [hereinafter DC RACIAL/
ETHNIC BIAS REPORT]; FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
(1992) [hereinafter DC GENDER BIAS REPORT]. The report on racial and ethnic bias noted that
these courts are a "unique environment. The majority population of the District of Columbia is
African-American, as is the work force in the courts and almost 40% of the Superior Court judici-
ary." DC RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS REPORT, supra, at 9. For example, the Task Force concluded that
"the evidence presently available did not support a finding of discrimination against racial or ethnic
minorities" in the disciplinary system. Id. at 42. Nonetheless concerned about "subtle, not overt"
problems, the Task Force called for efforts to enhance inclusiveness. Id. at 19; see also id at 26
(discussing the failure to "keep up with the growth of the Hispanic community" and the resulting
problems of language services and employment).
The task force on gender bias found that the local courts of Washington D.C. were a more
hospitable environment than the federal courts in the District because of the presence of many wo-
men on the bench and the number of women practitioners. DC GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra, at 93.
The task force did find that bias exists, but noted that the evidence did not support a finding of
"pervasive" bias. Id. at 98.
34. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 5 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter NEW YORK GENDER BIAS REPORT].
35. REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 12
(1991) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT GENDER REPORT]; see also REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 42 (1990) (finding that "gender bias permeates Florida's
legal system today"); THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS 5 (1990) (finding that women are "at a disadvantage during [divorce] settlement negotia-
tions"); see also id. at 15 (rape victims are discouraged from prosecuting by "the treatment they
receive from the justice system"); see also id. at 28 (while there are not plentiful examples of "overt
discrimination.., more subtle forms of bias persist"); MARYLAND GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 28, at iv ("[W]omen's negative experiences cover the range from the aggravating to the life-
threatening .. "); WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS
xvi (1989) ("[G]ender discrimination exists and can negatively impact judicial decision making and
affect the outcome of litigation.").
36. NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES, Vol. II, supra note 29, at 1; see also WASHINGTON
MINORITY AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 30, at xxi ("Minorities... do not trust the court
system to resolve their disputes or administer justice even-handedly"); NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE
ON MINORITY CONCERNS, FINAL REPORT, 1 N.J. LAWYER 1225, 1230 (Aug. 10, 1992) [hereinafter
NEW JERSEY MINORITY REPORT] ("Minority litigants, minority witnesses, and minority attorneys
are subjected to racial and ethnic slights from all levels of court and security personnel-from the
bailiff to the bench."); FLORIDA RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 29, at viii
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turbing frequency at every level of the legal profession and court system."1
37
In short, the fears of the majority in McCleskey were well-founded: "Unex-
plained" disparities in treatment correlate with membership in minority
groups and "even [with] ... gender."
'38
The existence of these task forces and their findings have particular sig-
nificance for this symposium about the role of legal educators. The McCles-
key Court, apparently seeking solace in the limits of social science, used
professors' caveats about the import of their findings as the basis for dismis-
sal of the relevance of that work to the justice system.39 Whatever knowl-
edge law professors and social scientists might have had about the
functioning of the judicial system was disregarded; we were collectively re-
manded to our classrooms and law reviews.
Task forces do the opposite. They rely on data developed by professors
and are willing to accept the difficulties of parsing the many variables that
might affect an outcome. Task forces relax the barriers between the worlds
of practice and the academy; they invite us (members of the academy) in.
Task forces use the very materials-history, social experiences, and quantita-
tive data-rejected by the McCleskey Court to yield the broad conclusions
quoted above. Moreover, these conclusions are officially authored by chief
justices and leading jurists and lawyers (and not "only" by academic lawyers
and social scientists, and not "only" by members of the group against whom
the discrimination runs) and are published in reports literally stamped with
a court's seal.
Once issued, these reports have not been met with widespread denial of
the existence of the problems documented. Rather, in some jurisdictions,
the reports have done a good deal more than simply sit. Proposals for
change have been considered, legislation has been passed, and some "pro-
gress"-measured in terms of appointments to the bench, integration of
court-appointed committees, programs to educate judges and lawyers about
their discriminatory patterns, rule changes, and the like-has occurred. Bias
is now a topic of judicial conferences, of lawyer meetings, and of private
discussions.4° Sexual harassment policies have been developed,41 canons of
("[Ejvidence in Florida suggests that the rights of non-English speaking defendants are systemati-
cally being compromised due to the lack of trained, qualified court interpreters.").
37. FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC
ISSUES IN THE COURTS 2 (1989) [hereinafter MICHIGAN RACIAL/ETHNIC REPORT]; see also NEW
JERSEY MINORITY REPORT, supra note 36, at 1238 ("Ample evidence supports a broad perception
of insensitivity and indifference exhibited sometimes by judges, court employees, members of the bar
... and other persons who work in courthouses.. .
38. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316-17.
39. See, eg, id. at 293 n.l 1 (quoting "McCleskey's expert" as testifying that models provide
information about the "average" and "do not depict the experiences of a single individual"); id. at
308 ("Even Professor Baldus does not contend that his statistics prove that race enters into any
capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case.") (footnote
omitted).
40. For example, see the resolution enacted unanimously by the officers of the Essex County
Bar Association of New Jersey, calling for (inter alia) a "permanent task force" on issues of racial/
ethnic discrimination in the courts; a revised bail system "free of bias [that] ... gives minimum
weight to economic criteria because such factors generally impact unfairly upon racial minorities";
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ethics rewritten,42 legislation enacted,43 and training programs on the
problems of victims of violence created.44 As the five year summary of ef-
forts in New York on women's issues put it: "Now, inescapably, gender bias
and the concerns of women are on the agenda."' 45 Some celebration is in
order, for a measure of success can fairly be claimed. 46
What has not happened is the howl of pain that such findings might have
prompted, nor the profound transformation that appears to be demanded.
Just as in the classrooms in which the cheerful constitutional story remains
largely unchanged, so in the courthouses and judicial systems: no one ap-
pears to be shaking in his boots (an apt metaphor given the demographics of
the legal profession). Phrases like "there is evidence that bias does occur
with disturbing frequency at every level of the legal profession and court
system" 47 are uttered, repeated, printed, pronounced, but without much in
terrorem effect. Rather, the reports and their conclusions are absorbed,
calmed, and translated into another form of polite conversation about the
administration of justice, albeit a conversation that affects that administra-
tion somewhat.
Like the critical commentaries about legal education, which if fully em-
braced would require rewriting the basic texts, task force conclusions would
also require dramatic upheavals-such as halting the imposition of the death
penalty, altering the criteria for sentencing because of findings of differential
"cautionary jury instructions relative to... cross-racial identification... "; the "establishment of a
non-discriminatory bar examination"; and a requirement that judges read and post statements "op-
posing racial and ethnic bias in the courts." Memorandum of Robert D. Lipscher to Hon. Theodore
Z. Davis, Comments on the Final Report of the Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns 3-4
(Dee. 28, 1992) (on file with the Stanford Law Review); see also Memorandum from Judge Robert
Boochever to Attendees at the January 27, 1993 meeting on The Effects of Ethnicity, Race and
Religion on the Ninth Circuit, supra note 31, at 2-4 (Alaska programs on cultural awareness and
sentencing reform reduced statistical evidence of discrimination based on race).
41. See, eg., U.S. DISTRICT COURT & U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY 1 (Feb., 1993) (applicable to "a member of the Dis-
trict or Bankruptcy Clerk's Offices, Probation Office, Pretrial Services Office, or judicial staff" as well
as to "any non-staff person") (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
42. See, e.g., Mich. Bar Approves Antibias Rules for Codes of Conduct, BAR LEADER, Nov.-
Dec. 1990, at 4-5 (state bar approves new rules that provide that lawyers and judges not "engage in
invidious discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or
ethnic origin, and shall prohibit staff and agents subject to the lawyer's direction and control from
doing so."); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C)
(1990) ("A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.").
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.29 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that each judicial nomina-
tions commission shall be composed of three members, "at least one of whom must be a member of a
racial or ethnic minority group or a woman"); N.Y. CRIM. PROC., § 170.55(4) (MeKinney Supp.
1993) (permitting adjournments in contemplation of dismissal conditioned on a defendant attending
educational programs on family violence).
44. See FIVE YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 27-31 (1991) [hereinafter NEw YORK FIVE YEAR REPORT].
45. Id. at 44.
46. A more optimistic view is expressed by Norma Wikler's metaphor, "water on stone"--that
task forces will wear away discrimination, as water wears away stones. Wilder, supra note 16.
47. See MICHIGAN RACIAL/ETHNIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 2. Compare the title of an
ongoing task force in Canada-Commission on Systematic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
Stystem.
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treatment, and finding different means of protecting women from violence.
But in both classroom and courtroom, the routine supported by assertions of
constitutional order endures. McCleskey remains the template. Even as the
dissent chastised the majority for its unwillingness to consider Warren Mc-
Cleskey's claim of racial discrimination, the dissent reassured the majority
that its "projection of apocalyptic consequences for criminal sentencing
[was] . . . greatly exaggerated."4 The prediction has proved accurate:
Although task forces find pervasive discriminatory behavior (predicated on
race, ethnicity, and "even gender") that affects the judicial process in a myr-
iad of illicit ways, "apocalyptic consequences" have not followed.49 The
powerful structures of the law (and of culture in the United States in gen-
eral) can even authorize inquiry, ask forbidden questions, obtain informa-
tion, and still remain impenetrable to profound change. The fundamental
accusation-oppression intrinsic in the delivery of justice-remains beyond
comprehension. 50
Thus, a first conclusion is that a decade of academic and court-based
documentation of deep-seated and endemic unfairness has not undermined
the resiliency of legal culture as expressed by those who lead the bench, bar,
and academy, who are by definition those of us with privilege. In class-
rooms, in courtrooms, and in the intersections such as task forces, in which
lawyers, judges, and academics join together, the responses have been consis-
tent. Even as we tell of the horrors of the many forms of discrimination, we
somehow continue to tell of the joys of legalism and of the hope that we can
"fix" it-that the conditions we find are but temporary aberrations rather
than aspects deeply anchored in and intrinsic to our history. 51 Task force
48. 481 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that certain forms of race- and gender-based discrimi-
nation have been exacerbated over the last decade. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race,
Gender, Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1073 (1992) (examining judicial responses to de-
fenses to job segregation with the claim that either "women" or "minorities" "prefer" certain kinds
of work; finding that this "lack of interest" defense, identified in sex discrimination cases, is now
being accepted as a justification for racial segregation; and concluding that these decisions evidence
court-based gender and race bias.)
50. Recall the majority's words: "McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State's
criminal justice system." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
51. Both the absence of horror and the aspirations about the capacity to fix some of the
problems documented by task forces rely in part on the fact that many task forces focus on court-
room interaction and the legal profession. Finding the absence of people of color and white women
in the higher echelons of court systems comes neither as a great surprise (the idea of an exclusionary
workplace is familiar) nor as a source of outrage (debates on affirmative action have muffled such
responses). Further, given the miseries of so many aspects of human life, while exclusion from the
judiciary and the legal professional elite is undesirable, it is not awful. Similarly, the completeness of
the exclusions (such that, as of 1991, 60 of the 94 federal trial courts had no life-tenured judges who
were women, and of 64 sitting bankruptcy judges in 1992 within the Ninth Circuit, none were per-
sons of color) avoids aspects of the affirmative action debate. Whatever one's views about quotas,
many are willing to see zero as an unacceptably low number and are willing to look for (if not find)
"qualified candidates."
The focus on the demographics of the courts and the working environment is not only more
palatable, it is in turn fueled by the resource constraints that haunt task forces. As is familiar both to
social scientists and lawyers, counting individuals is far easier than identifying and specifying the
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reports have not borrowed Robert Cover's title, "Justice Accused,"15 2 but
instead label their work as "gender equity" and "fairness in the courts."
'53
A second conclusion stems from my noncasual use of the word "we" in
the paragraph above, a word that is often used deliberately by law professors
and by judges in classrooms and on task forces. The "we" is not only proof
of the ubiquity of the cheerful story; it is also proof of contemporary affirma-
tion of the aspirations of that story. Both the legal academy and the task
forces are constantly in the process of reaffirming-pledging allegiance-to
this constitutional faith. But not all who invoke the "we" (either in the
academy or in the courts) share world views; further, within some of the
current critical academic commentary, the reliance on a "we" is a central
topic of concern. By examining some of the different political views (associ-
ated in contemporary legal education with differing schools of scholarship)
that can underlie the invocation of a "we," I hope to illuminate the interac-
tion between academic theory and contemporary legal reform efforts and to
join others in developing alternative understandings of this legal regime.
A first and powerful set of arguments that rely on and substantiate the
use of the word "we" comes from a school of thought known as civic repub-
licanism. Indeed, court-based task forces on discrimination can be under-
stood as civic republicanism (in the Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein
sense,54 without the Kathleen Sullivan criticism 55) played out in practice.
"We," with some power of governance, join together in dialogue to recom-
mit to the values of equality and justice by sharing in the common enterprise
of reconsidering the means by which justice is delivered and by declaring a
readiness to change, when necessary.
interaction among the many variables that result in courtroom decisions. As the New York Five
Year Report put it: "Many of the most damaging problems the Task Force found simply defy
objective measurement. Among these are the attitudes of judges, the atmosphere in courtrooms, and
perceptions of credibility." NEW YORK FIVE YEAR REPORT, supra note 44, at 43.
52. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
53. Such a choice is not surprising, given the "insider" quality of the authors of the task forces.
Such involvement-first to gain the imprimatur of the court and then to use that authority to effectu-
ate change-diminishes the possibility of aggressive accusations, for "we" must accuse ourselves.
See Joan Entmacher, Dissonant Discourses: Legal Ideology and Feminist Theory in the Work of
Task Forces on Gender Bias in the Courts (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford
Law Review) (effects of obtaining legitimation include dampening of critical commentary).
54. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1502-03, 1526 (1988) (calling
for a revival of earlier United States' political thought about participation, dialogue, and plurality so
as to inform contemporary constitutional analysis and to enable it to become (borrowing Robert
Cover's phrase) "jurisgenerative" and to flourish in the "modern context of equality of respect, liber-
ation from ascriptive social roles, and indissoluble plurality of perspectives"); Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988) (detailing republicanism's
commitment to "civic virtue," "equality of political actors," "universalism," and "citizenship" (i.e.,
participatory rights) and showing how those values, as reformulated, affect constitutional under-
standings of the regulation of electoral politics, the allocation of power between state and federal
government, and the treatment of discriminated-against minorities).
55. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1718, 1722 (1988) (ar-
guing that the Michelman/Sunstein views of the ability to incorporate involuntary groups in the new
models of republicanism are inconsistent with their assumptions about the capacity to arrive, by
dialogue, at agreement and at shared understandings of "a single common good.").
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Further, as is illustrated in Frank Michelman's essay, this "we" wants to
believe that "we" are inclusive and egalitarian; "we" have a hard time ac-
knowledging how deeply flawed and resistant to change the political struc-
ture is. Michelman defines "American constitutionalism" as based on "two
premises regarding political freedom: first, that the American people are
politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves collectively,
and, second, that the American people are politically free insomuch as they
are governed by laws and not men [sic]."'5 6 But he adds a qualification to
that definition-a "sic"-to signal the reader that the word "men" is an
error in the original phrase, not his.
However, as task forces on bias as well as recent televised hearings of
senatorial committees remind us, the "sic" is no error, no vestige of bygone
days, but an accurate contemporary description.5 7 In the "sic" is revealed
both the commitment to better justice and the reluctance to see gendered
justice. In the task forces, as in Michelman's essay and in many law school
classes, gender neutral language is substituted-to express the desire to in-
clude. Unfortunately, that language can also have the pernicious effect of
implying that the task of inclusion has been accomplished. Further yet, it
assumes that inclusion, rather than transformation-a change in the basic
narrative-is the desired end-point.
A second source for the use of "we" comes not from scholars attempting
to explore how, despite and sometimes because of difference, conversation
can proceed to produce a common good, but from law and economics schol-
ars who often assume a universally shared set of values that requires no fur-
ther specificity. Law and economics models play this out, not only through
their reductionist assumptions but also by the central term of the dis-
course-"rationality." It is not always clear whether such universalizing
stems from commitment to political theory or from ignorance. Some of
those who claim the "we" do not appear to know that they lack the author-
ity to use it, nor seem to have considered that they should be circumspect
before assuming the ubiquity of their own experiences.58
But of course, law and economics scholars are by no means outliers in
claiming generalizability; such is the stuff of most forms of theory. The
problem is central to contemporary feminist theory, which in turn has spe-
cial relevance to the work of gender bias task forces. Within feminist theory,
deployment of the word "we" often raises the charge of "essentialism." The
concern is about the use of "woman" as a universal category. The critique
addresses two sets of claims. First, the category "woman" has been used by
men to essentialize women's nature and then to oppress. Second, the cate-
56. Michelman, supra note 54, at 1499-1500 (footnotes omitted).
57. Given a president and vice president who are male, a Congress that is overwhelmingly
male, and that 72 women hold statewide elected executive positions, governance by "men" seems a
more than fair description. Center for the American Woman and Politics, Statewide Elective Execu-
tive Women 1993 (fact sheet) (April 1993) (on file with the Stanford Law Review); see also Women
on the Ballot Female Ranks in Elected Jobs get a Big Boost, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 28 (citing
1992 figures).
58. My colleague Catharine Wells has nicely termed this "psychological imperialism."
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gory "woman" has been used: by white women, claiming to speak for wo-
men of other colors; and/or by straight women, claiming to speak for
women who are lesbian or bisexual; and/or by middle class women, claiming
to speak for lower class women; and/or by younger women, claiming to
speak for aging women. The criticism is that first men, and then women of
relative power (in terms of access to the means of publication) within the
women's movement, have used their platforms to explain, and therefore ne-
gate, erase, or appropriate, the experiences of those unlike themselves. 59
Unlike modes of legal scholarship that express no interest in the problem
of essentialism, contemporary feminism-both within and without the legal
academy60-is much absorbed with this problem and how to respond.
Within feminism, the "we-sayers" have replied sometimes with a confession
of error, sometimes with a retreat to particularity, and sometimes with a
rejection, based on the view that "women" remains the relevant category.
Yet, here I want to point to a discontinuity between classroom and court-
room critiques. Feminism's concern about the propriety of the use of the
word "we" (here standing for all women) is not much in evidence in the
published gender bias task force reports,61 which are themselves the product
of feminism. The generic "woman" is often invoked in these reports. Hence
the questions: Why is the general category of "woman" such a constant
refrain in gender bias task forces? How might that fact inform feminist the-
ory? And how might it inform the understanding of the persistence of con-
stitutional faith and of the possibility of telling other stories of the past and
present?
Responding requires a return to the task forces on gender bias and racial
and ethnic bias with the "we" question in mind. The first gender bias task
force project was launched in 1982, before much of the writing on the prob-
lem of essentialism was published in the legal literature. 62 In 1986, the Judi-
cial Education Program of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and the Foundation for Women Judges provided a manual to guide the work
of the many jurisdictions addressing the issue. That manual counsels against
exploring race and gender together, for fear of "overload and confusion" of
focus. 63 The manual advises "awareness" of the intersections of other forms
59. See AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 110-23 (1984); ADRIENNE RICH, Compulsory Het-
erosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985,
at 23 (1986); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1990).
60. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Linda Gordon, On "Difference," 10 GENDERS 91 (1991).
61. See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 59 (1989); Harris, supra note 59 (1990); see also Regina
Austin, Sapphire Boundl, 1989 WISC. L. REV. 539; Man J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 'WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
63. LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN & NORMA JULIET WIKLER, OPERATING A TASK FORCE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR ACTION 6 (1986) (a section of the manual is
entitled "The Task Force Should Deal with Gender Bias Only" and the authors explain:
"[A]ttempting simultaneously to investigate all forms of racism and other kinds of bias in addition to
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of bias with gender and suggests that other task forces be directed to address
the other "isms." 64
Unfortunately, the hoped-for awareness of the intersections of gender,
ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation has not much been translated into
data and commentary in the twenty plus reports now published on gender
and the courts. Women of color are, with a few exceptions, not discussed.
65
Sexual orientation is also rarely addressed.66 Task forces on race and ethnic
bias have also not devoted sustained attention to women of color.67 Excep-
sexism at an appropriate level of detail would be impossible within the constraints imposed on a
Task Force."); cf Presentation of Judge Gladys Kessler, Second National Conference on Gender
Bias in the Courts 8 (Mar. 18, 1993) (unpublished speech, on file with the Stanford Law Review)
(urging task forces on race and gender to be convened at the same time because, while each group
should have "separate leadership and membership," interaction between them is important). The
Foundation for Women Judges has since been renamed the Women Judges' Fund for Justice.
64. SCHAFRAN & WIKLER, supra note 63, at 6. The six jurisdictions that have thus far pub-
lished reports on race and gender may well have taken this advice. Three (New Jersey, New York,
and Washington) published gender reports first, and then published race/ethnic reports thereafter.
Three (the District of Columbia, Florida, and Michigan) have published the results of two concur-
rently-sitting task forces, one on gender and one on race/ethnicity.
65. Of the 24 reports on gender considered here, only a few discuss, sometimes briefly, the
distinctive status of being both a woman and of color. See, eg., CALIFORNIA DRAFT GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 28, at § 10 (describing the concomitant effects of gender and racial and ethnic
bias); CONNECTICUT GENDER REPORT, supra note 35, at 83 (finding that "black women's average
sentence length was 10.5 months longer than white women's"); DC GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 33, at 62 (noting lack of African-American women in the upper echelons of the court's
workforce); KENTUCKY GENDER FAIRNEsS REPORT, supra note 28, at 8, 22, 35 (reporting that
minority women law professors encounter "greater barriers" than white women and men of all col-
ors; African-American women were less likely to receive alimony than white women in divorce
litigation and more likely, in criminal litigation, to be charged if apprehended for shoplifting); FINAL
REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS
10-12, 21 (1989) (analyzing data based on "race and gender" profiles, discussing problem of "cate-
gory blending," and breaking out responses based on majority and minority males and females);
NEW YORK GENDER REPORT, supra note 34, at 195-97 (race affecting credibility); id at 253 (men-
tioning minority women as court employees); NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT 104-12 (discussion draft, July 1992) (the problems of immigrant women)
[hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT]; id at 128-38 (the obstacles to
law enforcement efforts to protect women members of Indian tribes from crimes of violence). The
District of Columbia's Task Force on Gender Bias considered issues of child abuse and neglect, and
reported that it was the first to do so; such a choice might reflect concern about the intersections of
race, ethnicity, and gender. DC GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 33, at 165-74.
66. See, eg., CALIFORNIA DRAFT GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 28, § 4 at 33, 62 (propos-
ing that judges be prohibited from discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation, race, gender, or
ethnicity); GEORGIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 28, at 185 (noting press commentary that
judges discriminate on the basis of "sexual lifestyle" when making child custody decisions); REPORT
OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSA-
CHusErrs 65 n.56 (1989) (nearly one fifth of lawyers responding reported judicial discrimination in
custody decisions against "lesbian or gay parents").
67. Florida's report on racial and ethnic bias is the only one that devotes a chapter to issues of
women of color, the specific focus is on "minority women employees and attorneys." FLORIDA RA-
CIAL/ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 29, at 49-60. Other reports occasionally mention
women of color. See, eg, DC RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS REPORT, supra note 33, at 18 (discussing the
differences in hiring patterns of Black and White females); MICHIGAN RACIAL/ETHNIC REPORT,
supra note 37, at 40, 42, 62, 64 (reporting data delineating majority males and females from minority
males and females); NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES, Vol. I., supra note 29, at 22 (noting that
"[r]acial bias against litigants is sometimes compounded by gender bias"); WASHINGTON MINORITY
AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 30, at 65-66, 68-69, 76 (noting "how the combined effects of race,
ethnicity and gender are related to law practices and incomes" and to legal education); id at 110-15
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tions exist, as a few of the reports make mention of the intersections of gen-
der, race, and ethnicity.68 It is not yet clear whether the growing concerns
of feminist legal literature about essentialism and the ongoing discussions
within women's organizations about this issue will result in changes in the
task forces' agendas.69
Explanations of why women of color have not, until recently, been a
focus of task forces mirror those about the development of awareness of di-
versity among women within the legal academy. Those with the power to
speak, speak first from their own experience, but do not always know (or
care) that they are assuming the generalizability of that experience. Most of
the "first" women in law were white women,70 many of whom deserve credit
for putting "women's issues" on the agenda. The failure to differentiate
among women may have stemmed from unself-conscious assumptions of
sameness, from theoretical commitment to sameness, and/or from strategi-
cally motivated views about how to obtain some gains.71 This sameness
thread in feminist theory and practice is related to the constitutional story of
inclusion (the impulse to edit the phrase about constitutionalism being a gov-
ernment of laws, not men, to add "women"). The deployment of the "we,"
however, can be heard as welcoming or oppressing, or both.
Task forces emerge out of political and social settings in which their offi-
cial sources can rarely be women of color. Not only were white women the
first entrants to the legal academy as law students and professors, recent
studies continue to document discrimination against women of color72 and
have not yet asked the question in the context of class and sexual orienta-
(data on representation of people of color in court employment); NEW JERSEY MINORITY REPORT,
supra note 36, at 1231 (female "minority prisoners" affected by "multiple factors,"); id. at 1245
(discussion by president of Black Women Lawyers' Association); id. at 1266 (workforce data by
color and gender).
68. E.g., FLORIDA RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 29; NnrH CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 65; NEW YORK GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 34, at 195-97 (titling one subsection "Race and Economic Status as Affecting Credibility"). At
least one ongoing task force on gender and racial bias, that of the federal courts for the District of
Columbia, has divided into one group focusing on race and one on gender, and the gender group has
a subcommittee devoted to Class, Race, and Gender issues.
69. Another source of attention to the issue of women of color comes from members of the
National Consortium of Task Forces and Commissions on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts.
They conducted a panel discussion on the topic at the Second National Conference on Gender Bias
in the Courts, held in March of 1993 and co-sponsored by the NCSC, the National Association of
Women Judges, and the Women's Fund for Justice.
70. See KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR 142-72 (1986) (chronicling black
women's admission to law schools and the bar); id. at 148 ("[By] the 1940s there were only fifty-
seven black women lawyers in the entire United States."); Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge
Folt" Constitution-Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991); Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz:
"First Woman," 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 673 (1988).
71. As Linda Gordon understands this problem of feminism, this approach may have "held
back possibilities for political unities among women: by postulating gender difference so intensely,
white feminists had tended to render minority cultures less visible and minority feminists had to
respond by emphatically exploding false postulations of sisterhood." Gordon, supra note 60, at 100.
72. Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a
Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299, 2301 (1992)
(from 1986-1991, minority women joined law faculties at lower ranks, were assigned lower status
teaching positions, and were hired at less prestigious schools than minority men).
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tion.73 The relatively few women of color in the legal profession are often
both low in the hierarchy74 and asked constantly to lend their efforts to hun-
dreds of projects that have suddenly become self-conscious about the white-
ness and maleness of their committees. The composition of the judiciaries
that in turn empower task forces reflect this pattern. Six women described
as "minorities" currently sit on the highest courts of their jurisdictions.
75
Few women of color are senior members of law firms, United States Attor-
neys, chiefs of public defender offices, leaders of public interest law
projects, 76 or holders of chairs on law school faculties. The fact that women
of color are not sufficiently represented in the ranks of the powerful does not,
of course, document their absence from the subject matter of the work-or
the absence of effects of gender and race on justice. But their absence from
positions of power explains to some extent the evolution of an agenda that
has not attended to the discrete issues of women of color and has assumed
the racelessness of white women.
But why do white women with some power not insist on the inclusion of
women of color as a central part of the project? (Note here that I frame the
question not in terms of all members of task forces, which in fact include and
73. In 1990, the American Association of Law Schools changed its by-laws to require schools
to "pursue a policy of providing [their] students and graduates with equal opportunity to obtain
employment, without discrimination... on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, handicap or disability, or sexual orientation." ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
1993 HANDBOOK 31-32 (1993) (art. 6, § 4(b) of By-laws). Implementation efforts have been contro-
versial, in part because one of the most visible discriminators has been the United States military.
See Christopher R. McDowell, The AALS Sexual Orientation Policy: The Argument Against Barring
Military Recruitersfrom Law School Campuses, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 163 (1992); Gene P. Schultz, The
Inclusion of Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policies: A Survey of American Law Schools, 2
L. & SEXUALITY 131 (1992).
The California Bar has begun to learn about the effects of sexual orientation on its membership.
See SUSAN H. RUSSELL & CYNTHIA L. WILLIAMSON, DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF THE STATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA 2 (1991) (membership survey of bar that included questions about whether respon-
dents considered themselves members of the "gay, lesbian, or bisexual community," to which three
percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative).
74. FLORIDA RACIAL/ETHNIC BIAS STUDY, supra note 29, at 53 (1% of all judges in Florida
are women of color).
75. They are: Joyce L. Kennard (California Supreme Court); Judith W. Rogers (Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia); Julia Cooper Mack (Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia); Annice Wagner (Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); Rosemary Barkett (Florida
Supreme Court); Leah J. Sears-Collins (Georgia Supreme Court); and Dorothy Comstock Riley
(Michigan Supreme Court).
Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, three have female chief justices, of whom two
(Judith Rogers of the District of Columbia and Rosemary Barkett of Florida) are women of color.
This information is derived from THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC: A COMPLETE REFERENCE TO VITAL
FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 995-99 (1993), and the ABA, The Directories
of the Minority Judges in the United States of America, § I at 35, 45, 140; § II at 5, § III at 30, 40
(1992). Judge Wagner is the chair of the District of Columbia's Task Force on Gender Bias in the
Courts and, to my knowledge, is the only woman of color who sits both on the highest court of her
jurisdiction and on a race or gender bias task force.
76. See Catherine S. Manegold, Memories Drive NAACP Fund's New Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1993, at B10 (Elaine Jones is the "first woman" to head the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund and, in the late 1960s, was the first Black woman ever to graduate from the University of
Virginia Law School).
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are often chaired by men,77 but rather ask it of white women, whom I per-
ceive as specially-obligated and situated to understand the importance of dis-
tinctions among women.) Just as in the academic literature, so as in life:
The response is sometimes a confession of error, sometimes a retreat to par-
ticularity, sometimes an explanation that resources do not permit more, and
sometimes a rejection, based on the view that "women" remains the relevant
category.
But there is something else that is true in life, and may well be true, but
unsaid, in the literature. If and when white women attempt to lend their
hands to the work of exploring the intersections of race and gender, they (or
more accurately, "I" here: white and a member of a task force and not sure
whether I speak for others) risk wanting to "yell" at all men, including those
who are members of minority communities. But I fear that any criticisms
will be used oppressively by the majority male community. To be blunt,
given the controversy about Anita Hill's decision to complain about the be-
havior of a black man,78 white women are (and should be) reticent to give
voice to such complaints. And should also be reticent about not giving voice
to such complaints. "Skipping" race, blurring race, or leaving race to an-
other task force are ways to avoid the discomfort, albeit not the issues. The
impulse is to escape into a "we."
Here is the core, as I experience the "essentialism" question in my life as
scholar, law professor, and task force member. I, a white woman, (appropri-
ately) fear that my actions and voice will volitionally or inadvertently con-
tinue to oppress those who are not white. I, a white woman, also believe in
the relevance of my womanhood and of the experiences that make me feel
kinship across racial, ethnic and other lines more readily with women than
with men. I, a white woman, believe I have an obligation not to speak for all
women at all times and moreover have an obligation to identify distinctions
among women. I, a white woman, also want to insist on the continued rele-
vance of the category "woman" for certain times and places, and in particu-
lar, for the structure of the law.79 I, a white woman, keenly aware of the
limits of my own experience, feel an obligation to seek the participation of
nonwhite women in the academic and worldly work I do, and I, a white
woman, feel self-conscious about the burdens my needs for conversation may
impose on women of color.
I, a white woman, also see that frame-"I, a white woman"-as too nar-
77. As the manual on gender bias task forces notes, "[a]nother requisite for a Task Force is a
number of male judges, lawyers or judicial educators concerned about the problem and willing to
participate. Their involvement enhances the credibility of the Task Force and bolsters interest and
support in the judicial/legal community." SCHAFRAN & WIKLER, supra note 63, at 6.
78. See, e.g., Margaret A. Burnham, The Supreme Court Appointment Process and the Politics
of Race and Sex, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 290, 308-15 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992).
79. Thus I object to the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize pregnant women as a class and to
understand the relationship between discrimination against pregnant women or all women. See Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759-62 (1993).
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row, too fixed, too acontextual. I see many aspects of personhood, both
within myself and others, and believe there are dynamic relationships among
class, race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and age such that the sali-
ency of these characteristics is not stable but varies in context.s° I, a white
law professor, have many times heard and told of the United States' legal
structure as centrally about the domination of whites over blacks. I, a wo-
man raised on the East Coast, see the impulse to frame the story of race as
about black and white relations and specifically as about how African-Amer-
icans relate to whites. I, living in Los Angeles, see the inadequacies of that
paradigm in a setting of multi-racial/ethnic conversations, in which whites
are a numerical minority.81 I, a task force member and law review writer,
rebel at phrases such as "women and minorities" and know the need for
other language-and know that it is not repeating the "laundry list" of "the
groups" that forms a response suffcient to this problem. I say all of this in
the voice of extreme particularity-I, I, I-but I suspect that my feelings
may be shared by others.82
And so I return to the two pulls-the fundamental critique of law and
the impulse to believe (let alone to tell) the cheerful story. The low visibility
of women of color in the task force reports on both gender and race is yet
another example of the accuracy of the critique. The more one looks, the
thicker become the data of exclusion, oppression, and silence, all the while
under the invocation of the universal "we." But in theory, the cheerful story
tells me that I too will have occasion to speak, to participate in the dia-
logue,8 3 to shape the polity's norms, and thus it gives me a wedge, a claim
about the authority to speak and about the possibility of change.84 With
that story, I can focus on the very existence of feminism within law schools,
on the fact of task forces at all, and on the conversations that have begun to
move us away from the "shell game of identity politics. 8 5 It is thus not
surprising that, for me and many others with the power to tell it, it is hard to
leave the cheerful constitutional story behind.
80. In Dependent Sovereigns Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, supra note 7, at
702-27, I developed this point in the context of analysis of the relationships among Indian tribes
(which are themselves constructs of United States' law), the federal government, and the states.
Determining the meaning of "membership" in the Santa Clara Pueblo depended on who was asking
that question, and for what purpose. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
81. Whether the meaning and deployment of the term "minority" will be stable over time is
questionable; its current usage connotes not only small numbers but also relatively little power.
82. For other white women's explorations of related themes, see Gordon, supra note 60;
Deborah L. Rhode, Enough Said, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 35 (1991) (describing the discomfort as
a white feminist in discussion about difference); Christine Stansell, White Feminists and Black Reali-
ties: The Politics of Authenticity, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 78, at
251.
83. Here I am back at civic republicanism. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
84. I thus share critical race theory's critique of critical legal studies. See Kimberlb Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
85. This nice phrase is Christine Stansell's. Stansell, supra note 82, at 266.
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APPENDIX A: REPORTS ON GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC BIAS IN
THE COURTS*
I. RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCE REPORTS
FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (District of Columbia,
1992)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RA-
CIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, "WHERE THE INJURED
FLY FOR JUSTICE," Vol. One (Florida, 1990)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RA-
CIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, "WHERE THE INJURED
FLY FOR JUSTICE," Vol. Two (Florida, 1990)
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RA-
ciAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURT (Michigan, 1989)
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS,
INTERIM REPORT (New Jersey, 1989)
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS,
FINAL REPORT (New Jersey, 1992)
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORI-
TIES (NEW YORK, 1991):
VOLUME ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VOLUME Two: THE PUBLIC AND THE COURTS
VOLUME THREE: LEGAL EDUCATION
VOLUME FOUR: LEGAL PROFESSION, NONJUDICIAL OFFICERS,
EMPLOYEES AND MINORITY CONTRACTORS
VOLUME FIVE: APPENDIX-STAFF REPORTS AND WORKING
PAPERS
MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, STATE OF WASHINGTON: FINAL
REPORT (Washington, 1990)
II. GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORTS
A. FEDERAL REPORTS
NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT: DIS-
CUSSION DRAFT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1992)
B. STATE REPORTS
ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS, THE
DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (California, 1990)
* This Appendix provides a list, by jurisdiction, of the reports reviewed for this essay. The
National Center for the State Courts provides updated information on the work of gender, race, and
ethnic bias task forces.
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GENDER & JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS, COLORADO SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Colorado, 1990)
REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE, GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE
COURTS (Connecticut, 1991)
FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (District of Columbia,
1992)
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COM-
MISSION (Florida, 1990)
GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM (Georgia, 1991)
ACHIEVING GENDER FAIRNESS: DESIGNING A PLAN TO ADDRESS GEN-
DER BIAS IN HAWAII'S LEGAL SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE AD HOC COM-
MITTEE ON GENDER BIAS (Hawaii, 1989)
THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS (Illinois, 1990)
KENTUCKY TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN (Kentucky, 1992)
LOUISIANA TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS: FINAL REPORT
(Louisiana, 1992)
MARYLAND SPEICAL JOINT COMMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
(Maryland, 1989)
REPORT ON THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
(Massachusetts, 1989)
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS (Michigan, 1989).
REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA SURPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GEN-
DER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (Minnesota, 1989)
JUSTICE FOR WOMEN: FIRST REPORT OF THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Nevada, 1988)
THE FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (New Jersey, 1984)
THE SECOND REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE
ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (New Jersey, 1986)
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW MEXICO STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON WO-
MEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (New Mexico, 1990)
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
(New York, 1986)
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FINAL REPORT OF THE RHODE ISLAND COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS: A REPORT ON GENDER BIAS (Rhode Island, 1987)
UTAH TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE UTAH JU-
DICIAL COUNCIL (Utah, 1990)
GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE VERMONT TASK FORCE ON GEN-
DER BIAS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Vermont, 1991)
FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER
AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS (Washington, 1989)
WISCONSIN EQUAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (Wisconsin,
1991)
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